EVIDENCE OF AN INJURED WITNESS

EVIDENCE OF AN INJURED WITNESS:

The evidence of the injured eyewitnesses regarding the scene of offence remained unshaken. The injured witnesses are also termed as stamped witnesses.

In criminal jurisprudence, the testimony of an injured witness has high evidentiary value, for, ordinarily a person who suffered injuries at the hands of another would not shield the real offender and falsely implicate an innocent. 

This view is supported by a catena of judgments (Vide Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar; Malkan Singh v. State of U.P; Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab; Appabhai v. State of Gujarat; Bonkya v. State of Maharashtra; Bhag Singh v. State of Punjab; Mohar v. State of U.P.; Dinesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan; Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan; Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy v. State of A.P.; and Balraje v. State of Maharashtra).

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Mansingh and others, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of injured witnesses has greater evidentiary value and unless compelling reasons exist, their statements are not to be discarded lightly.

In B.K. Channappa v. State of Karnataka, though the Supreme Court found certain contradictions in the evidence of the material witnesses, it has placed heavy reliance on the testimony of injured witnesses despite some improvements, contradictions and omissions therein. After referring to relevant case law on this aspect, the Supreme Court in Abdul Sayeed v. State of M.P., succinctly summarized the law as under:

"The law on the point can be summarized to the effect that the testimony of the injured witness is accorded a special status in law. This is as a sequence of the fact that the injury to the witness is an inbuilt guarantee of his presence at the scene of the crime and because the witness will not want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to falsely implicate a third party for the commission of the offence. Thus, the deposition of the injured witness should be relied upon unless there are strong grounds for rejection of his evidence on the basis of major contradictions and discrepancies therein."

MOTIVE FOR A CRIME

MOTIVE FOR A CRIME:

In Shivaji Genu Mohite v. State of Maharashtra , the Supreme Court held that evidence as to motive would, no doubt, go a long way in cases wholly dependent on circumstantial evidence, that such evidence would form one of the links in the chain of circumstantial evidence in such a case, but, that would not be so in cases where there are eye-witnesses of credibility, though even in such case if motive is properly proved such proof would strengthen the prosecution case and fortify the court in its ultimate conclusion, but that does not mean that if motive is not established the evidence of an eye- witness is rendered untrustworthy.

In a catena of decisions, the Supreme Court held that even if the absence of motive as alleged is accepted, that is of no consequence and it pales into insignificance when direct evidence establishes the crime. Therefore, in case there is direct trustworthy evidence of witnesses as to the commission of an offence, the motive part loses its significance and if the genesis of the motive of the occurrence is not proved, the ocular testimony of the witnesses as to the occurrence could not be discarded only by the reason of the absence of motive, if otherwise the evidence is worthy of reliance (Hari Shanker v. State of U.P.; Bikau Pandey and others v. State of Bihar; and Abu Thakir and others v. State of Tamil Nadu).

In Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Bihar the Supreme Court held that motive is something which prompts a person to form an opinion or intention to do certain illegal act or even a legal act but with illegal means with a view to achieve that intention, that in a case where there is clear proof of motive for the commission of the crime, it affords added support to the finding of the court that the accused was guilty of the offence charged with, but it has to be remembered that the absence of proof of motive does not render the evidence bearing on the guilt of the accused nonetheless becomes untrustworthy and unreliable because most often it is only the perpetrator of the crime alone who knows as to what circumstances prompted him to adopt a certain course of action leading to the commission of the crime. 

In Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab the Supreme Court reiterated its view that motive is in the mind of the accused and can seldom be fathomed with any degree of accuracy.

In Subedar Tewari v. State of Uttar Pradesh the Supreme Court observed that the evidence regarding existence of motive which operates in the mind of an assassin is more often than not within the reach of others and that the motive may not even be known to the victim of the crime.

In the light of the settled legal position as above, if the prosecution has let in the evidence of eyewitnesses which is found trustworthy, the accused is liable to be convicted even if motive is not fully established.

DELAY IN FILING FIR - EFFECT

DELAY IN FILING F.I.R. - EFFECT:

The law is well settled that mere delay in lodging the F.I.R. is not by itself fatal to the case of the prosecution. (See: Ashok Kumar Chaudhary v. State of Bihar). 

In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Gian Chand a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court had observed thus:

"12. Delay in lodging the FIR cannot be used as a ritualistic formula for doubting the prosecution case and discarding the same solely on the ground of delay in lodging the first information report. Delay has the effect of putting the Court in its guard to search if any explanation has been offered for the delay, and if offered, whether it is satisfactory or not. If the prosecution fails to satisfactorily explain the delay and there is a possibility of embellishment in prosecution version on account of such delay, the delay would be fatal to the prosecution. However, if the delay is explained to the satisfaction of the Court, the delay cannot by itself be a ground for disbelieving and discarding the entire prosecution case."

Whatever might be the reason for the delay in registration of F.I.R., such delay may often leads to false implications; for the delay gives time for the defence to implicate even innocent, especially, when rivalry exists between the two parties. In this scenario, the delay in registration of F.I.R. leading to the possibility of false implications of some of the accused cannot be ruled out.

CORPORATION

Halsbury's Law of England:

"A corporation may be created by the authority of Parliament, expressed either in a special statute creating a particular corporation of Corporations, or in a general statute.

Under which any number of corporations may be created on complying with its terms. To constitute creation, however, it is not necessary that any particular form of words should be used in the statute; it Is sufficient if the intent to incorporate be evident. Where by an ancient statute a body of persons is empowered to sue and be sued by a special name, it is strong evidence that they constitute a corporation. Where a number of persons are so constituted by Act of Parliament that they have perpetual succession, are to continue for all time, take land, make contracts which shall be binding, not upon themselves, but upon the persons filling office, and are authorised to sue or be sued in the name of their treasurer, they are in the nature of a corporation aggregate at least for the purposes of the Act."

CORPORATION AGGREGATE -- DEFINITION:

CORPORATION AGGREGATE -- DEFINITION:

In Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn. Vol 9 P 4) "corporation aggregate7' has been defined as follows:

"A corporation aggregate has been defined as a collection of individuals united into one body under a special denomination, having perpetual succession under an artifical form, and vested by the policy of law with the capacity of acting in several respects as an individual particularly of taking and granting property, of contracting obligations and of suing and being sued, of enjoying privileges and immunities- in common, and of exercising a variety of political rights, more or less extensive according to the design of its institution or the powers conferred upon it, either at the time of its creation or at any subsequent period has only one capacity, namely its corporate capacity, so that a conveyance to a corporation aggregate can only be to it in its corporate capacity".