Writ of Mandamus - Principles

Writ of mandamus Principles:

In the decision reported in (2008) 2 SCC 280 (Oriental Bank of Commerce v. Sunder Lal Jain) in paragraphs 11 and 12 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus,

“11. The principles on which a writ of mandamus can be issued have been stated as under in The Law of Extraordinary Legal Remedies by F.G. Ferris and F.G. Ferris, Jr.:

Note 187.-Mandamus, at common law, is a highly prerogative writ, usually issuing out of the highest court of general jurisdiction, in the name of the sovereignty, directed to any natural person, corporation or inferior court within the jurisdiction, requiring them to do some particular thing therein specified, and which appertains to their office or duty. Generally speaking, it may be said that mandamus is a summary writ, issuing from the proper court, commanding the official or board to which it is addressed to perform some specific legal duty to which the party applying for the writ is entitled of legal right to have performed.

Note 192.-Mandamus is, subject to the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, the appropriate remedy to enforce a plain, positive, specific and ministerial duty presently existing and imposed by law upon officers and others who refuse or neglect to perform such duty, when there is no other adequate and specific legal remedy and without which there would be a failure of justice. The chief function of the writ is to compel the performance of public duties prescribed by statute, and to keep subordinate and inferior bodies and tribunals exercising public functions within their jurisdictions. It is not necessary, however, that the duty be imposed by statute; mandamus lies as well for the enforcement of a common law duty.

Note 196.-Mandamus is not a writ of right. Its issuance unquestionably lies in the sound judicial discretion of the court, subject always to the well-settled principles which have been established by the courts. An action in mandamus is not governed by the principles of ordinary litigation where the matters alleged on one side and not denied on the other are taken as true, and judgment pronounced thereon as of course. While mandamus is classed as a legal remedy, its issuance is largely controlled by equitable principles. Before granting the writ the court may, and should, look to the larger public interest which may be concerned-an interest which private litigants are apt to overlook when striving for private ends. The court should act in view of all the existing facts, and with due regard to the consequences which will result. It is in every case a discretion dependent upon all the surrounding facts and circumstances.

Note 206.- ... The correct rule is that mandamus will not lie where the duty is clearly discretionary and the party upon whom the duty rests has exercised his discretion reasonably and within his jurisdiction, that is, upon facts sufficient to support his action.

12. These very principles have been adopted in our country. In Bihar Eastern Gangetic Fishermen Coop. Society Ltd. v. Sipahi Singh after referring to the earlier decisions in Lekhraj Sathramdas Lalvani v. N.M. Shah, Rai Shivendra Bahadur (Dr.) v. Nalanda College and Umakant Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar this Court observed as follows in para 15 of the Reports (SCC): (Sipahi Singh case, SCC pp. 152-53)

15. ... There is abundant authority in favour of the proposition that a writ of mandamus can be granted only in a case where there is a statutory duty imposed upon the officer concerned and there is a failure on the part of that officer to discharge the statutory obligation. The chief function of a writ is to compel performance of public duties prescribed by statute and to keep subordinate tribunals and officers exercising public functions within the limit of their jurisdiction. It follows, therefore, that in order that mandamus may issue to compel the authorities to do something, it must be shown that there is a statute which imposes a legal duty and the aggrieved party has a legal right under the statute to enforce its performance.”

Final Report (Charge sheet) in Criminal cases

Final Report filed by Police in Criminal cases:

Actually a 'Final Report' filed by an Investigating officer, is loosely called as 'Charge Sheet'.

Based on a complaint of a complainant, police may register a case.

After investigation, the Investigating Officer may file a “Final Report” or closed the case as 'Mistake of Fact'. It is a “negative Final Report”.

If a negative final report is filed by the police before the Magistrate, the Magistrate shall issue notice to the defacto complainant. He may file his written objection which is used to be called 'protest petition'. The Magistrate, after perusing the Final Report and statements recorded by police under section 161 Cr.P.C. may agree with the conclusion of the Investigating Officer.

Under certain circumstances, a police case will become a private case and a private case will become a police case.

A private case filed under section 200 Cr.P.C. becomes a police case when a direction has been issued under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Because thereafter the police must necessarily register F.I.R. under section 154 Cr.P.C.

A F.I.R. so registered, when referred by the police and when a protest petition is filed by the defacto complainant, thereafter it must be proceeded with as a private complaint.

Thus the private case becomes a police case. In such a case, private complaint procedure has to be followed. (See Section 200, 202, 190(1)(a), 204, 203 Cr.P.C.)

When a referred charge sheet is filed by the police and on notice, the complainant files his objection/protest petition, the Magistrate has to record the sworn statement of the complainant and his witnesses and then peruse such materials and if he finds any sufficient reasons to proceed further, he can take cognizance under section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. and issue summons to the accused under section 204 Cr.P.C.

If there is no sufficient ground to proceed further, then he has to dismiss the protest petition under section 203 Cr.P.C. briefly stating his reasons for so doing.

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Compromise in Criminal cases

Compromise in Criminal cases:

(1)Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another [(2012) 10 SCC 303],

(2)B.S.Joshi vs. State of Haryana [(2003) 4 SCC 675],

(3)Nikhil Merchant vs. CBI [(2008) 9 SCC 677],

(4)Narinder Singh and others vs. State of Punjab and another [(2014) 6 SCC 466];

(5) State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Manish and others [(2015) 8 SCC 307]

It is observed as under:

“If the offences against women and children and the IPC offences falling under the categories, like, murder, attempt to murder, offence against unsound mind, rape, bribe, fabrication of documents, false evidence, robbery, dacoity, abduction, kidnapping, minor girl rape, idol theft, preventing a public servant from discharging of his/her duty, outrage of woman modesty, counterfeiting currency notes or bank notes, etc., are allowed to be compounded, it will surely have serious repercussion on the society, as the above mentioned list is only illustrative and not exhaustive.

Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences clubbed with Special Enactment, like Arms Act, the Prevention of Corruption Act, TNPPDL Act, TNPID Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity, etc., cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.

As held by the Apex Court, insofar the offences arising out of matrimonial dispute, relating to dowry or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature, are concerned, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak, in case the parties resolve their entire disputes amicably among themselves.

This Court feels that there cannot be any compromise in respect of the heinous and serious offences of mental depravity and in that case, the Court should be very slow in accepting the compromise.

If the compromise is entertained mechanically by the Court, the accused will have the upper hand.

The jurisdiction of this Court may not be allowed to be exploited by the accused, who can well afford to wait for a logical conclusion.

The antecedents of the accused have also to be taken into consideration before accepting the memo of compromise and the accused, by means of compromise, cannot try to escape from the clutches of law.”

Will Probate - Limitation Law

Will Probate - Limitation law:

2008 (2) CTC 850 (SC) = 2008 (8) SCC 463 (Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur Vs. Kirandeep Kaur):

"14. Article 137 of the Limitation Act reads as follows:

"137. Description of Application: Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in the Division.

Period of Limitation: Three years Time from which period begins to run: When the right to apply accrues."

The crucial expression in the petition (sic Article) is "right to apply". In view of what has been stated by this Court, Article 137 is clearly applicable to the petition for grant of letters of administration. As rightly observed by the High Court in such proceedings the application merely seeks recognition from the Court to perform a duty and because of the nature of the proceedings it is a continuing right. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court referred to several decisions. One of them was S.Krishnaswami and etc. etc. Vs. E. Ramiah, AIR 1991 Madras 214. In para 17 of the said judgment it was noted as follows:

"17. In a proceeding, or in other words, in an application filed for grant of probate or letters of administration, no right is asserted or claimed by the applicant. The applicant only seeks recognition of the court to perform a duty. Probate or letters of administration issued by a competent court is conclusive proof of the legal character throughout the world. An assessment of the relevant provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 does not convey a meaning that by the proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration, no rights of the applicant are settled or secured in the legal sense. The author of the testament has cast the duty with regard to the administration of his estate, and the applicant for probate or letters of administration only seeks the permission of the court to perform that duty. There is only a seeking of recognition from the court to perform the duty. That duty is only moral and it is not legal. There is no law which compels the applicant to file the proceedings for probate or letters of administration. With a view to discharge the moral duty, the applicant seeks recognition from the court to perform the duty. It will be legitimate to conclude that the proceedings filed for grant of probate or letters of administration is not an action in law. Hence, it is very difficult to and it will not be in order to construe the proceedings for grant of probate or letters of administration as applications coming within the meaning of an 'application' under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963."

15. Though the nature of the petition has been rightly described by the High Court, it was not correct in observing that the application for grant of probate or letters of administration is not covered by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Same is not correct in view of what has been stated in The Kerala State Electricity Board case (supra) (The Kerala State Electricity Board, Trivandrum Vs. T.P.Kunhaliumma, 1976 (4) SCC 634).

16. Similarly reference was made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani Vs. Sajni Prem Lalwani (AIR 1983 Bom. 268). Para 16 reads as follows:

"16. Rejecting Mr.Dalpatrais contention, I summarise my conclusions thus:

(a) under the Limitation Act no period is advisedly prescribed within which an application for probate, letters of administration or succession certificate must be made;

(b) the assumption that under Article 137 the right to apply necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the deceased, is unwarranted;

(c) such an application is for the courts permission to perform a legal duty created by a will or for recognition as a testamentary trustee and is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed;

(d) the right to apply would accrue when it becomes necessary to apply which may not necessarily be within 3 years from the date of the deceased's death;

(e) delay beyond 3 years after the deceased's death would arouse suspicion and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion;

(f) such delay must be explained, but cannot be equated with the absolute bar of limitation; and

(g) once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates.

17. Conclusion (b) is not correct while Conclusion (c) is the correct position of law."

Will and the Attesting Witnesses

Will and the Attesting Witnesses:

In AIR 2003 SC 761 (Janki Narayan Bhoir Vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam) the SC held that:

"9. It is thus clear that one of the requirements of due execution of a will is its attestation by two or more witnesses, which is mandatory.

10. Section 68 of the Evidence Act speaks of as to how a document required by law to be attested can be proved. According to the said section, a document required by law to be attested shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence.

It flows from this section that if there be an attesting witness alive capable of giving evidence and subject to the process of the court, has to be necessarily examined before the document required by law to be attested can be used in an evidence.

On a combined reading of Section 63 of the Succession Act with Section 68 of the Evidence Act, it appears that a person propounding the will has got to prove that the will was duly and validly executed. That cannot be done by simply proving that the signature on the will was that of the testator but must also prove that attestations were also made properly as required by clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act.

It is true that Section 68 of the Evidence Act does not say that both or all the attesting witnesses must be examined. But at least one attesting witness has to be called for proving due execution of the will as envisaged in Section 63.

Although Section 63 of the Succession Act requires that a will has to be attested at least by two witnesses, Section 68 of the Evidence Act provides that a document, which is required by law to be attested, shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been examined for the purpose of proving its due execution if such witness is alive and capable of giving evidence and subject to the process of the court.

In a way, Section 68 gives a concession to those who want to prove and establish a will in a court of law by examining at least one attesting witness even though the will has to be attested at least by two witnesses mandatorily under Section 63 of the Succession Act.

But what is significant and to be noted is that one attesting witness examined should be in a position to prove the execution of a will.

To put in other words, if one attesting witness can prove execution of the will in terms of clause (c) of Section 63 viz. attestation by two attesting witnesses in the manner contemplated therein, the examination of the other attesting witness can be dispensed with.

The one attesting witness examined, in his evidence has to satisfy the attestation of a will by him and the other attesting witness in order to prove there was due execution of the will. If the attesting witness examined besides his attestation does not, in his evidence, satisfy the requirements of attestation of the will by the other witness also it falls short of attestation of will at least by two witnesses for the simple reason that the execution of the will does not merely mean the signing of it by the testator but it means fulfilling and proof of all the formalities required under Section 63 of the Succession Act.

Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will under Section 68 of the Evidence Act fails to prove the due execution of the will then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence to make it complete in all respects.

Where one attesting witness is examined and he fails to prove the attestation of the will by the other witness there will be deficiency in meeting the mandatory requirements of Section 68 of the Evidence Act.

11. Section 71 of the Evidence Act is in the nature of a safeguard to the mandatory provisions of Section 68 of the Evidence Act, to meet a situation where it is not possible to prove the execution of the will by calling the attesting witnesses, though alive.

This section provides that if an attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the will, its execution may be proved by other evidence. Aid of Section 71 can be taken only when the attesting witnesses, who have been called, deny or fail to recollect the execution of the document to prove it by other evidence.

Section 71 has no application to a case where one attesting witness, who alone had been summoned, has failed to prove the execution of the will and other attesting witnesses though are available to prove the execution of the same, for reasons best known, have not been summoned before the court. It is clear from the language of Section 71 that if an attesting witness denies or does not recollect execution of the document, its execution may be proved by other evidence.

However, in a case where an attesting witness examined fails to prove the due execution of will as required under clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act, it cannot be said that the will is proved as per Section 68 of the Evidence Act.

It cannot be said that if one attesting witness denies or does not recollect the execution of the document, the execution of will can be proved by other evidence dispensing with the evidence of other attesting witnesses though available to be examined to prove the execution of the will.

Yet another reason as to why other available attesting witnesses should be called when the one attesting witness examined fails to prove due execution of the will is to avert the claim of drawing adverse inference under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act.

Placing the best possible evidence, in the given circumstances, before the Court for consideration, is one of the cardinal principles of the Indian Evidence Act.

Section 71 is permissive and an enabling section permitting a party to lead other evidence in certain circumstances.

But Section 68 is not merely an enabling section. It lays down the necessary requirements, which the court has to observe before holding that a document is proved.

Section 71 is meant to lend assistance and come to the rescue of a party who had done his best, but driven to a state of helplessness and impossibility, cannot be let down without any other means of proving due execution by "other evidence" as well.

At the same time Section 71 cannot be read so as to absolve a party of his obligation under Section 68 read with Section 63 of the Act and liberally allow him, at his will or choice to make available or not a necessary witness otherwise available and amenable to the jurisdiction of the court concerned and confer a premium upon his omission or lapse, to enable him to give a go-by to the mandate of law relating to the proof of execution of a will.

12. Turning to the facts of the case on hand, it is evident that only one attesting witness Prabhakar Sinkar, examined in the case, did not prove the execution of the will inasmuch as he did not prove the attestation of the will by the other attesting witness Wagle who though available was not examined. The scribe examined in the case was not an attesting witness, which is clear from the evidence on record and as rightly conceded so by the learned counsel for the respondent before us. Hence, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether the scribe in this case could or could not be an attesting witness. The evidence of Sinkar, the only attesting witness, does not satisfy the mandatory requirements of Section 68 of the Evidence Act. We are not in a position to accept the contention urged on behalf of the respondent that the evidence of other witnesses, namely, that of the respondent and the scribe could be considered under Section 71 of the Evidence Act.

Section 71 has no application when the one attesting witness, who alone has been summoned, has failed to prove the execution of the will and the other attesting witness though available has not been examined.

When the document is not proved as mandatorily required under Section 68 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 71 of the Evidence Act, which is permissive, and enabling in certain circumstances as discussed above does not help the respondent.

In Vishnu Ramkrishna and others Vs. Nathu Vithal and others (AIR 1949 Bom. 266), Chagla, C.J., speaking for the Division Bench in similar circumstances has stated that although Section 63 of the Succession Act requires that a will has to be attested by two witnesses, Section 68 of the Evidence Act permits the execution of the will to be proved by only one attesting witness being called.

Where the attesting witness, who is called to prove the execution, is not in a position to prove the attestation of the will by the second witness, the evidence of the witness called falls short of the mandatory requirements of Section 68. Section 71 of the Evidence Act can only be requisitioned when the attesting witnesses who have been called failed to prove the execution of the will by reason of either denying their own signatures or denying the signature of the testator or having no recollection as to the execution of the document.

This section has no application when one attesting witness has failed to prove the execution of the will and the other attesting witnesses were available who could prove the execution if they were called."
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Will - how to be proved

Will - how to be proved:

There is a long line of decisions bearing on the nature and standard of evidence required to prove a will. Those decisions have been reviewed in an elaborate judgment of the Supreme Court in R.Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N.Thimmajamma (1959 Supp (1) SCR 426 = AIR 1959 SC 443).

The Court, speaking through Gajendragadkar,J., laid down in that case the following propositions:

"1. Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty.

2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence.

3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will.

4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator.

5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator.

6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter.

Will -proof

Will -proof:

AIR 1962 SC 567 (Rani Purnima Debi and another Vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and another):

"5. Before we consider the facts of this case it is well to set out the principles which govern the proving of a will.

This was considered by this Court in H.Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N.Thimmajamma (1959 Supp (1) SCR 426 : (AIR 1959 SC 443).

It was observed in that case that the mode of proving a will did not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by S.63 of the Indian Succession Act.

The onus of proving the will was on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the. testator as required by law was sufficient to discharge the onus.

Where, however, there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the will could be accepted as genuine.

If the caveator alleged undue influence, fraud or coercion, the onus would be on him to prove the same. Even where there were no such pleas but the circumstances gave rise to doubts, it was for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court.

Further, what are suspicious circumstances was also considered in this case. The alleged signature of the testator might be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question was the signature of the testator might not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature.

The condition of the testator's mind might appear to be very feeble and debilitated and evidence adduced might not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will might appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or the will might otherwise indicate that the said dispositions might not be the result of the testator's free will and mind.

In such cases, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document was accepted as the last will of the testator.

Further, a propounder himself might take a prominent part in the execution of the will which conferred on him substantial benefits. If this was so it was generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder was required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence.

But even where there were suspicious circumstances and the propounder succeeded in removing them, the Court would grant probate though the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations.

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No one should have an advantage from his own wrong

A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage.

A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party.

In Vice-Chairman, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan Vs. Girdharilal Yadhav, reported in 2004 (6) SCC 325, the Supreme Court observed:

“11. The admitted facts remain that the respondent is a permanent resident of Haryana. It further stands admitted that at the relevant time, Ahirs/Yadavs of Haryana were not treated as OBC. It further stands admitted that the respondent obtained a certificate showing that he was a resident of Rajasthan, which he was not. It is not disputed that a detailed enquiry was conducted by the District Magistrate, Kota, wherein the respondent had been given an opportunity of hearing. It is also not in dispute that he had given an opportunity to show cause as to why his appointment should not be cancelled not only by the appointing authority but also by the Appellate Authority. In terms of sec.58 of the Evidence Act, 1972, facts admitted need not be proved. It is also a well settled principle of law that the principles of natural justice should not be stretched too far and the same cannot be put in a straitjacket formula.

In Bar Council of India Vs. High Court of Kerala, reported in 2004 (6) SCC 311, this Court (SC) has noticed that “24. The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula. Its application will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It is also well settled that if a party after having proper notice chose not to appear, he at later stage, cannot be permitted to say that he had not been given a fair opportunity of hearing. The question had been considered by a Bench of this Court in Sohan Lal Gupta vs. Asha Devi Gupta, 2003 (7) SCC 492, of which two of us (VN Khare, CJ. and Sinha J.) are parties wherein upon noticing a large number of decisions it was held. The principles of natural justice, it is trite, cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. In a given case the party should not only be required to show that he did not have proper notice resulting in violation of principles of natural justice but also to show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby.”

The principles of natural justice, it is well settled, must not be stretched too far. (see. Mardia Chemicals Ltd vs. Union of India, 2004 (4) SCC 311; and Canara Bank vs. Debasis Das, 2003 (4) SCC  577).

In Union of India vs. Tulsiram Patel, 1985 (3) SCC 398, whereupon SC held that “though the two rules of natural justice, namely, nemo judex in causa sua and audi alteram partem, have now a definite meaning and connotation in law and their content and implications are well understood and firmly established, they are nonetheless not statutory rules. Each of these rules yields to and changes with the exigencies of different situations. They do not apply in the same manner to situations which are not like. These rules are not cast in a rigid mould nor can they be put in a legal straitjacket. They are not immutable but flexible. These rules can be adapted and modified by statutes and statutory rules and also by the constitution of the Tribunal which has to decide a particular matter and the rules by which such Tribunal is governed.”

In Inderjit Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab, reported in 2011 (12) SCC 588, the SC held that – “15. Respondent 2 herself had been a party to the fraud committed by the appellant upon the civil court for getting the decree of divorce as alleged by her in the impugned complaint. Thus, according to her own admission she herself is an abettor to the crime.

A person alleging his own infamy cannot be heard at any forum as explained by the legal maxim “allegans suam turpetudinem non est audiendus”.

No one should have an advantage from his own wrong (commondum ex injura sua memo habere debet).

No action arises from an immoral cause (ex turpi cause non oritur action).

Damage suffered by consent is not a cause of action (volenti non fit injuria).

The statements/ allegations made by the Respondent 2 patently and latently involve her in the alleged fraud committed upon the court. Thus, she made herself disentitled for any equitable relief.”

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