Will -proof

Will -proof:

AIR 1962 SC 567 (Rani Purnima Debi and another Vs. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb and another):

"5. Before we consider the facts of this case it is well to set out the principles which govern the proving of a will.

This was considered by this Court in H.Venkatachala Iyengar Vs. B.N.Thimmajamma (1959 Supp (1) SCR 426 : (AIR 1959 SC 443).

It was observed in that case that the mode of proving a will did not ordinarily differ from that of proving any other document except as to the special requirement of attestation prescribed in the case of a will by S.63 of the Indian Succession Act.

The onus of proving the will was on the propounder and in the absence of suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the will proof of testamentary capacity and signature of the. testator as required by law was sufficient to discharge the onus.

Where, however, there were suspicious circumstances, the onus would be on the propounder to explain them to the satisfaction of the Court before the will could be accepted as genuine.

If the caveator alleged undue influence, fraud or coercion, the onus would be on him to prove the same. Even where there were no such pleas but the circumstances gave rise to doubts, it was for the propounder to satisfy the conscience of the Court.

Further, what are suspicious circumstances was also considered in this case. The alleged signature of the testator might be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature in question was the signature of the testator might not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature.

The condition of the testator's mind might appear to be very feeble and debilitated and evidence adduced might not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will might appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or the will might otherwise indicate that the said dispositions might not be the result of the testator's free will and mind.

In such cases, the Court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document was accepted as the last will of the testator.

Further, a propounder himself might take a prominent part in the execution of the will which conferred on him substantial benefits. If this was so it was generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder was required to remove the doubts by clear and satisfactory evidence.

But even where there were suspicious circumstances and the propounder succeeded in removing them, the Court would grant probate though the will might be unnatural and might cut off wholly or in part near relations.

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