IS INTERFERENCE WITH DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AMOUNTING TO CONTEMPT?

IS INTERFERENCE WITH DUE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AMOUNTING TO CONTEMPT?

YES. Substantial interference with the due administration of justice, amounts to contempt of court.

In Legal remembrancer v. Motilal Ghose, (1914) ILR 41 Cal 173 (1913-14 Crl LJ 321) his Lordships Chief Justice Jenkins observed that it was not enough that there should be a technical contempt of courts and that it must be shown that it was probable that the publication would substantially interfere with the due administration of justice.

In Ananta Lal Singh v. AH Watson, AIR 1931 Cal 257 : (1931-32 Cri LJ 675) Ranking C.J. observed that “A Court’s jurisdiction in contempt is not to be invoked unless there is real prejudice which can be regarded as a substantial interference with the due course of justice. It is not every theoretical tendency that will attract the action of the court in its very special jurisdiction. The purpose of the court’s action is a practical purposes and it is reasonably clear on the authorities this court will not exercise its jurisdiction upon the mere question of propriety where the tendency of a newspaper article to do harm is slight and the character and circumstances of a comment is otherwise such that is can properly be ignored.”

The above observations were approved by the SC in Rizwan-Ul-Hassan v. State of UP. 

In Andre Paul v. Attorney General, AIR 1936 PC 141, Lord Atkin observed that -- “Judges and courts are alike open to criticism, and if reasonable arguments or expostulation is offered against any judicial act as contrary to law or the public good no court would treat that as contempt of court. In applying the law the courts should not lose sight of local conditions. But whether the authority and position of an individual Judge or the due administration of justice is concerned, no wrong is committed by any member of the public who exercise the ordinary right of criticising in good faith in private or public, the public act done in the seat of justice. The path of criticism is a public way the wrong-headed are permitted to err therein; provided that members of the public abstain from imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administration of justice and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism and not acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of justice they are immune.”

In Emperor v. VB Kolte, AIR 1941 Nag 214, it was held that -- “Interference with the administration of justice is one of the well recognised heads of contempt. What has to be seen is whether the person sought to be proceeded for contempt did interfere or did intend to interfere with the administration of justice. Courts, no doubt have to be jealous to guard against any interference with their function but on the other hand they should not be too sensitive where no harm has been caused or was intended to be caused.”

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