How is Section 14 of the Limitation Act to be understood?

Law of Limitation Sec.14

Justice Mahmood, Allahabad High Court, in 1886:

How is Section 14 of the Limitation Act to be understood? 

The original section on the subject was Section 14 of the Act of 1859, which ran thus: 

"In computing any period of limitation prescribed by this Act, the time during which the claimant, or any person under whom he claims, shall have been engaged in prosecuting a suit upon the same cause of action against the same defendant or some person whom he represents, bond fide and with due diligence in any Court of Judicature, which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause, shall have been unable to decide upon it, or shall have passed a decision which, on appeal, shall have been annulled for any such cause, including the time during which such appeal, if any, has been pending, shall be excluded from such computation." 

Here the most important expression is "same cause of action" and also "defect of jurisdiction or other cause."  These words, however, are ambiguous. The section was reproduced in Section 15 of the Limitation Act of 1871; and while its language was more or less preserved, the expression "same cause of action" was changed to "same right to sue." The expression "other cause" was changed to " other cause of a like nature," and the words "is unable to try it" were added. This phraseology, however, still created considerable doubt, which was manifested in a number of cases, and finally, Section 14 of the present Act again reverts to the old expression "same cause of action" instead of "same right to sue," and changes "is unable to try it" into "is unable to entertain it." 

I venture to say that if ever there was an ambiguous clause it is this. In the first place, "cause of action" is a phrase which has given rise to more difficulty than almost any other. It may mean the title plus the injury, or, as it is often used in England, only injuria or the violation of right. Then the words "unable to entertain it" are almost equally vague, and the Legislature might well have added illustrations to make them definite. If I were to interpret Section 14 in a liberal sense, I should hold that the present claim refers to the same cause of action, i.e., relates to the same dispute as the former litigation. This, however, it is not necessary for me to rule. But I base my judgment upon the words "good faith" and "other cause of a like nature."