Adoption and Datta Homa ceremony

 Adoption and Datta Homa ceremony

The question which falls for decision in this case is whether the performance of the ‘datta homam’ ceremony is essential when a Brahmin adopts the son of his daughter.

Natesa Aiyar adopted the respondent, the son of his only daughter. Natesan Aiyar was joint with his brother and his brother’s son. (joint family).

Natesa Aiyar died in 1929. The adopted son filed the suit for partition of the joint family properties in 1930. The defendants/appellants denied the factum of adoption. And advanced the alternative plea that if he was adopted the adoption was invalid as the ‘datta homam’ ceremony had not been performed.

The District Munsif of Kumbakonam considered that the ceremony was not necessary for a valid adoption and he allowed the partition suit. In appeal, the Subordinate Judge also concurred the finding of the District Munsif and dismissed the appeal.

Whether the performance of ‘datta homam ceremony’ was essential for adoption in the family of Brahmin caste?

The Privy Council in Bal Gangadhar Tilak v. Shrinivas Pandit, (1915) 29 MLJ 34, had finally settled that the ‘datta homam ceremony’ is not necessary when the adoption is of a Brahmin boy of the same gotra.

In Singamma v. Ramanujacharlu (1868( 4 MHCR 165, it was held that in order to establish a valid adoption in a Brahmin family proof of the performance of datta homam was not essential; proof of the giving and taking was sufficient. In that case it was not known whether the adopted boy was or was not of the same gotra.

This decision was followed by Kindersley and Muttuswamy Aiyar JJ, in Chandramala v. Muktamala (1882) ILR 6 Mad 20, which related to an adoption by a Kshatriya. Muttuswamy Aiyar J, observed that if the question whether religious ceremonies were essential to adoption were res integra (not yet decided by any Courts), he would have felt considerable difficulty in holding that the ceremony of datta homam was not of the essence of a valid adoption among the three higher classes.

The same doubt was expressed in the judgment of Turner CJ and Muttuswamy Aiyar JJ,  in Venkata v. Subhadra (1884) ILR 7 Mad 548. 

In Govindayyar v. Doraisami (1887) ILR 11 Mad 5 (FB), a Full Bench, consisting of Collins CJ, and Kernan, Muttuswamy Aiyar, Brandt and Parker JJ, held that the ceremony of datta homam was not essential to a valid adoption among Brahmins in Southern India when the adoptive father and son belonged to the same gotra. 

The homa or the like ceremony is not necessary in the case of adoption of the daughter’s or the brother’s son; by the verbal gift and acceptance alone, that is, accomplished; this is declared by the Lord Yama.

Little is known of Yama but his name appears in the list of law-givers set forth in the Smriti of Yagnavalkya. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee accepted the text as of unquestionable genuineness and authority and set forth his reasons in detail. 

Lord Hobhouse in delivering the judgement referred to the fact that one ancient sage called the holy Yama expressly asserts the right to adopt a sister’s son. It is true that the Yama text is in conflict with the Dattaka Chandrika in that the latter does not recognise the validity of the adoption of a daughter’s son. The prohibition has, however, not been observed in Southern India, where a custom exists of adopting a sister’s or a daughter’s son.

If the Yama text is accepted it must be held that the ceremony is not essential to a valid adoption.

The words of Manu:  Between a son’s son and the son of a daughter there exists in this world no difference; for even the son of a daughter saves him (who has no sons) in the next world, like the son’s son. 

This may be reason why Yama declared that the data homan ceremony was not essential in the case of adoption of a daughter’s son, but the validity of the text does not depend on the discovery of the reason for the rule.

Dattaka Chandrika and Dattaka Mimamsa are works of great and unquestionable authority on Hindu Law in matters relating to adoption and that both of them clearly laid down that datta homa is essential among the twice-born classes to the establishment of the filial relationship of the person adopted. This is the general rule, but the exception is the text of Yama.

The expression ‘Vagdanadeva’ (by verbal gift alone) cannot apply to a Dattaka form of adoption as corporeal delivery and acceptance of the child is universally treated as the essential part of an adoption in the Dattaka form. This form of Vagdanadeva (by verbal gift) is used in contradistinction to ‘Homadi niyama’ (prescription of homa or the like), to convey the meaning that no gift accompanied by the burning of the sacrificial fire and Vyahrities, etc.

‘Dana’ or gift ordinarily imports corporeal delivery and ‘Vag-dana’ (verbal gift) is used merely to make it clear that the delivery is to be made with appropriate words showing an intention to give.

Moreover, in the case of ‘putrika putra’ (daughter’s son) there is no adoption by the maternal grandfather at all. The daughter’s son when born automatically became the son of the maternal grandfather if the latter had no male issue. He was recognised as one of the subsidiary sons in the Hindu law not by virtue of any adoption but by mere intention on the part of the maternal grandfather and without any consent asked for or obtained. (Mayne’s Hindu Law).

**